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 
Abstract— Distribution markets are among the prospect being 
considered for the future of power systems. They would facilitate 
integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) and 
microgrids via a market mechanism and enable them to monetize 
services they can provide. This paper follows the ongoing work in 
implementing the distribution market operator (DMO) concept, 
and its clearing and settlement procedures, and focuses on 
investigating the pricing conducted by the DMO. The 
distribution locational marginal prices (D-LMPs) and their 
relationship with the transmission system locational marginal 
prices (T-LMPs) are subject of this paper. Numerical simulations 
on a test distribution system exhibit the benefits and drawbacks 
of the proposed DMO pricing processes.  
 
Index Terms—Power distribution, microgrids, power system 
economics, electricity markets. 
NOMENCLATURE 
a        Elements of the bus-line incidence matrix. 
b     Load benefit. 
Cc     Customer payments to the DMO. 
Cu     DMO payment to the ISO. 
CΔ    DMO cost surplus.  
f       Superscript for fixed loads.  
g      Index for bid segments. 
     Penalty factor for the power deviation.  
m        Index for distribution system buses. 
D        Load demand.  
PM    Power transfer from the main grid. 
MPD    Total assigned power from the main grid. 
PL    Line power flow. 
PLmax     Line power flow limit. 
DX The amount of load awarded to each segment of the 
bid. 
PXmax Maximum capacity of each bid segment. 
r   Superscript for responsive loads (proactive 
customers). 
t             Index for hours. 
ΔP         Power transfer deviation. 
λ            Transmission locational marginal price (T-LMP). 
λD     Distribution locational marginal price (D-LMP). 
pos
tP   Variables used to linearize absolute value. 
 
 
neg
tP   Variables used to linearize absolute value. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
IGH penetration of proactive customers that utilize 
variety of distributed energy resources (DER), electric 
vehicles, and flexible loads are frequently mentioned as the 
characteristics of future power grids [1]–[7]. This growing 
trend is advocated in order to handle challenges such as 
growing demand and boost efficiency in the grid operation 
while meeting the standards put in place by various 
environmental regulations [8], [9]. Proactive customers in the 
distribution system are not completely relying on the utility 
grid to provide their demand; they can self-sustain, in many 
cases of DER deployment, and even actively participate in the 
electricity markets and provide several valuable services. In 
order for proactive customers to be able to realize their full 
capabilities, to monetize services they provide and to play a 
role in system pricing and clearing decision-making processes, 
it is necessary to modernize the existing distribution system 
operation and enable these entities to participate in the 
electricity market [10]. 
The direct control and dispatch of the proactive customers 
by the independent system operator (ISO) would create 
several problems such as potential violation of distribution 
companies’ responsibilities and also creating complexities in 
the market optimization as the participation of proactive 
customers grows [11], [12]; hence, several proposals have 
been offered trying to define an entity that establishes an 
electricity market and facilitates market participation at the 
distribution level. Distributed System Platform Provider 
(DSPP) is introduced in New York via the Reforming the 
Energy Vision program as one of the early efforts in this 
direction [13]. DSPP is proposed to operate in accord with the 
electric utility and be in charge of the market operations. It 
would coordinate with the ISO, customers, and market 
participants. According to this proposal, distribution system 
platform (DSP) is a set of functions provided by the utilities to 
enable broad market participation. Similar to this effort, the 
Distribution System Operator (DSO) is introduced in 
California as an entity to be in charge of providing reliable 
distribution services to the customers and further ensuring 
predictability for the ISO. It wouldbe coordinating the 
physical transactions in the transmission-distribution interface 
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but not necessarily the financial aspects of those transactions 
that  [12], [14]–[16] propose can still be among the 
responsibilities of ISO. The role of the DSO introduced in 
[17] is similar to that of an ISO but for the distribution system. 
The DSO would not only be responsible for the reliable 
operation of the distribution system but also for providing 
demand response. The DSO would have transactions with the 
wholesale market at the substation level on one side and 
proactive customers on the other side. Depending on the 
extent of the ISO’s responsibility in dispatching resources in 
the distribution system, there would be different levels of the 
DSO autonomy in operating the distribution system and the 
degree of the ISO’s control over it. The DSO can only act as 
an aggregator and deliver ISO’s dispatch commands or 
operate a retail market at the distribution level, or something 
between these two extremes. In [18] the prospective roles for 
the DSOs are listed including “managing multidirectional 
flows, organizing auctions, and offering other incentives” in 
order to minimize the operation costs of the DSO. In [19] 
control strategies to coordinate several microgrids within a 
distribution system via a distribution network operator (DNO) 
is proposed. The DNO can trade energy with the microgrids 
and the high-voltage transmission system. The problem is 
formulated as a two-level optimization where microgrids 
optimize their energy cost at the lower level and the DNO 
ensures operational constraints at the higher level of 
optimization. In [20] it is asserted that the utilities should 
transition their distribution system operation responsibilities to 
an independent distribution system operator (IDSO) while 
owning distribution assets. It is argued that operation of the 
distribution system by the utilities poses a conflict of interest, 
and as utilities tend to expand their assets it would reduce 
greater market participation of the proactive customers. The 
proposed IDSO would be in charge of the system reliability, 
provide market mechanisms, and optimally schedule the 
distribution level resources. It would make system 
management easier for the utilities and determine the value of 
services provided by proactive customers more objectively.  
Most of these proposals, however, are conceptual and lack 
a detailed rigorous analysis of distribution market operations. 
It is necessary to clearly define the roles of different parties 
involved in the distribution system undergoing market-based 
evolution and further investigate the detailed market 
processes. Among the concerns that needs to be addressed is 
the structure of the distribution market operation, the way it is 
settled [21], and how the procedures for distribution market 
clearing and settlement are established. The study in [22] 
points out the necessity of the DSOs to be capable of 
providing settlements with the ISO for any resource in the 
distribution system. Studies in [23], [24], furthermore present 
a marginal pricing method for the DSO considering the 
congestion problem in the distribution system, and optimizing 
the social welfare in a system with high penetration of electric 
vehicles. 
The distribution market operator (DMO) is a rather similar 
entity discussed by authors in [25][26]. The DMO function 
focused in this work is to facilitate the establishment of 
market mechanisms in distribution systems and it will be an 
interface interacting with both the ISO and proactive 
customers to enable participation of customers in the 
wholesale market. The DMO receives the demand bids from 
customers in the distribution system, aggregates them and 
submits a single aggregated bid to the ISO. After market 
clearing by the ISO, the DMO divides the assigned power 
awarded to it between the participated customers. The DMO 
can be part of the electric utility company or be formed as a 
separate entity. In either case, it should be an independent 
operator so as to guarantee the fairness in the market 
operation. The DMO manages the financial transactions and 
electric distribution company (EDC) carries out the physical 
transactions.  
The implementation of a distribution market and 
establishment of the DMO offers several advantages for 
customers and the system as a whole: (i) Under distribution 
markets, the proactive customers’ demand is set by the DMO 
and known with certainty on a day-ahead basis, which would 
enable an efficient control of the peak demand, increase 
operational reliability, and improve efficiency; (ii) The 
proactive customers can participate in the electricity market as 
a player and exchange power with the utility grid and other 
customers. The DMO would facilitate market participation 
and coordinate the proactive customers’ interactions with the 
utility grid to minimize the associated operational risks and 
uncertainties; (iii) There will be a considerable reduction in 
the required communication in the system as the proactive 
customers and the ISO only need to communicate with the 
DMOs. Considering the listed advantages, and many more 
that will be obtained once these deployments are more 
widespread, distribution markets can be considered as both 
beneficial and necessary components in modern power grids 
which will help accommodate a large penetration of proactive 
customers. In terms of the distribution market clearing and 
settlement, the models proposed in [25], [26] were 
investigated in detail in [27], in which constant and variable 
power clearing schemes were studied. This paper focuses on 
how the locational marginal prices in the transmission side of 
the DMO (i.e., T-LMP) are reflected in the distribution system 
locational marginal prices (i.e., D-LMP). Furthermore, 
microgrids will be considered for studies as a representative of 
proactive customers. Microgrids models, however, can be 
simplified to model any other type of the proactive customer, 
such as prosumers or responsive consumers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
formulation for the proposed DMO market clearing and 
settlement is demonstrated in section III, numerical 
simulations are presented in section IV, and the paper is 
concluded in section V. 
II.  DISTRIBUTION MARKET MODEL 
The DMO collects demand bids from the microgrids in the 
distribution system, creates an aggregated bid, and submits 
this bid to the ISO. A typical microgrid bid is shown in Fig. 1. 
 3
The ISO collects the demand bids (from the DMOs as well as 
curtailment service provides) and generation bids (from 
GENCOs), and determines the generation and load schedule. 
Once the DMO is notified of the ISO’s clearing process 
decisions, it determines the amount of power generation, 
transfer and demands within the distribution system, and 
settles the prices and costs among various participants in the 
market, with the objective of ensuring an optimal operation 
and a fair settlement.   
 Fig. 1 Demand bid curve for customer at bus i with a three-segment bid 
 
III.  DISTRIBUTION MARKET CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT  
The DMO’s objective is to maximize the distribution 
system social welfare (1), i.e., load benefits minus generation 
cost (which is the cost of assigned power from the main grid). 
This paper proposes to add the last term in the objective to 
penalize violations in the assigned power.  
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The power assigned to the DMO by the ISO is determined 
via the wholesale market clearing, hence it is constant. The T-
LMP is also determined by the ISO. The penalty coefficient μ 
is multiplied with the deviation to ensure that the assigned 
power will be followed in the distribution network. The 
objective is subject to distribution network and microgrids 
prevailing constraints (2)-(6): 
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The nodal power balance is ensured in (2) where the power 
injected to each bus from connected lines is equal to total bus 
load. The power balance at transmission-distribution interface 
is ensured by (3) in which the power transferred by the main 
grid is distributed among lines connected to this bus (here the 
bus number 0). The load of passive customers will be 
constant, while that of proactive customers is variable and 
defined by the associated segments (4). The scheduled load of 
microgrids is determined based on the scheduled power 
consumption in each bid segment, in which each segment is 
limited by its associated maximum capacity (5). Line power 
flows are limited by the line capacity limits (6). The added 
penalty in the objective function, which is represented as the 
absolute value of the deviation makes the problem nonlinear. 
In order to linearize this term and to ensure a linear 
programming problem, (8)-(11) are used. negtP and postP are 
two non-negative variables used to model the absolute value. 
If the variable inside the absolute value is positive, negtP would 
be equal to zero and when the value is negative postP would be 
equal to zero. This is guaranteed to happen since the problem 
is formulated as a linear programming minimization solved by 
the Simplex method. 
The D-LMP in each bus is calculated as the dual variable 
of the power balance equation in that bus (2), i.e., as a 
byproduct of the proposed clearing problem. The relationship 
between the D-LMP and the T-LMP depends on the value of 
the penalty factor μ. In this paper, the distribution market 
clearing is conducted in two ways based on the penalty factor: 
grid-following clearing and grid-independent clearing, as 
discussed further in the following: 
A.  Grid-following clearing 
When μ=0 in the proposed formulation, the D-LMP at bus 
0 of the distribution (point of connection to the transmission 
network) will be equal to the T-LMP. In this case the DMO is 
permitted to import power from the utility grid more/less than 
the power assigned to it by the ISO, as there would be no 
penalty. This results in the T-LMP to be reflected in the D-
LMPs within the distribution system. At down-stream buses, 
however, D-LMPs will be determined based on the T-LMP, 
marginal cost of dispatchable units, and possible distribution 
line congestions.  
B.  Grid-independent clearing 
As the amount of μ is increased, the DMO seeks to 
minimize the deviation of the scheduled power with the 
assigned power transfer set by the ISO. In this case the 
dependency of D-LMPs to the T-LMP will be lowered. For 
the very large values of the penalty factor, there would be no 
violation of the power transfer schedule determined by the 
ISO, while the D-LMPs will be merely functions of the 
dispatchable units’ marginal price and possible distribution 
line congestions.  
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C.  Market Settlement  
Using D-LMPs, obtained from either methods, the market 
can be settled, i.e., the payments from customers and the 
payments to the utility can be determined. The payment of 
each customer is calculated as the D-LMP times the associated 
load. The total customer payments is the summation of all 
payments (12), in which Dmt includes both consumers and 
microgrids. The payment to the utility is calculated as the T-
LMP times the assigned power by the ISO (13). Since losses 
are ignored in the proposed market clearing model, the sum of 
the distribution loads will be equal to the total power assigned 
by the ISO (14).  
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Considering the payments, the DMO cost surplus can be 
calculated as the difference between the two calculated 
payments as in (15): 
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The obtained CΔ can be negative, positive, or zero. The cost 
settlement is one of the challenges facing DMOs as they 
operate radial networks, as opposed to the wholesale power 
system operated by ISOs, and they should guarantee a fair 
market participation by customers at different locations across 
the feeders. This issue will be the topic of a future research by 
authors.  
IV.  NUMERICAL RESULTS 
The IEEE 13-bus test system [28] in used to investigate the 
viability and the merits of the proposed processes. Fig. 2 
depicts this system in which microgrids are located at buses 2, 
3, 5-7, and 10-13. Each customer submits a four-segment 
power demand bid of maximum 10 MW. A large capacity for 
distribution lines is considered, however it is assumed that 
lines 3-8 and 4-5 have smaller capacities and then subject to 
potential congestions. Various cases have been studied 
considering the various values for parameters in (1). 
 Fig. 2 IEEE 13-bus standard test system. 
 
Case 1: In this case μ is assumed to be 0, and the distribution 
market clearing results for a variety of T-LMPs is determined. 
The results of this case are shown in Fig. 3, which illustrates 
the effect different values of the T-LMP on the marginal price 
of each bus in the distribution system. A scaling factor is used 
to change T-LMPs. As the scaling factor increases the power 
is to be purchased at a higher rate, resulting in a lower power 
transfer from the ISO and more local generation. This results 
in lower congestion as the prices of the all busses tend to be 
equal at higher values of the scaling factor. At lower T-LMP 
values, D-LMPs follow the T-LMPs and can also impact the 
grid prices as they respond to the price variations by 
modifying their power injections.   At lower scaling factors, 
congestion at line 3-8 results in a rise of D-LMPs in buses 6-
12. These buses have the same D-LMPs as the lines in the 
downstream of the feeder do not become constrained.  
 
 Fig. 3 Daily average LMP at each bus for different T-LMP values (using a 
scaling factor) 
 
Case 2: In this case the second term in (1) is assumed to be 0, 
i.e., the T-LMP is negligible, and μ is varied, so the 
independent operation of the distribution market can be 
analyzed. The results of this case are shown in Fig. 4, which 
illustrates the effect of raising μ on D-LMPs. As μ increases, 
the DMO seeks to minimize the deviation from the assigned 
power transfer. The prices, however, tend to approach the 
prices when the scheduled power is used without any option 
to deviate. When μ approaches infinity, the D-LMPs are 
functions of marginal prices of the dispatchable units and 
become independent of the T-LMPs. This would result in the 
settlement costs of the distribution system be higher, lower, or 
equal to the payments to the ISO depending on the marginal 
costs.  
 Fig. 4 Daily average D-LMP as a function of μ. 
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Case 3: In this case the T-LMP and μ are both nonzero. The 
results of this case are shown in Figs. 5 and 6. In Fig. 5, T-
LMP scaling factor varies between 0.1 and 0.9 while μ is kept 
at 1. The corresponding difference between the customers’ 
payment to the DMO and payment to the ISO is depicted in 
Fig. 6 (a deficit for the DMO). It means that while the DMO 
tries to minimize the deviation of the power transfer with 
respect to the scheduled power, a term exists in the objective 
that seeks to minimize the power transfer (even at the expense 
of higher deviation) to reduce the payments to the ISO.  
 
Fig. 5 Daily average D-LMPs as a function of scaling factors while μ =1. 
 
 Fig. 6 Payment received by DMO minus payments to the ISO. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
One of the challenges in the operation of distribution 
markets is the clearing and settlement method they should use, 
and the consequent impacts on the distribution market prices. 
This paper studied the interdependencies between D-LMPs at 
a distribution network with the T-LMP at the upstream node. 
It was shown that by adding a penalty factor the D-LMPs 
could be calculated in a way that the prices follow the 
associated T-LMP or be determined independent of that. It 
was further shown that these price would significantly change 
the market settlement. The decision on the exact value for the 
penalty coefficient, however, should be made by the DMO.  
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